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Anna T. Cianciolo and Robert J. Sternberg. Intelligence: A Brief History. Blackwell Brief
Histories of Psychology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. 170 pp. $52.95 (cloth).
ISBN 1-4051-0823-1. $17.95 (paper). ISBN 1-4051-0824-X.
From the outset, Intelligence: A Brief History presents its readers with a problem: what
is this book really about? Judging from the title, the unwary reader would presume that
Cianciolo and Sternberg have set out to provide a quick overview of the historical develop-
ment of the concept of intelligence, the practices that have been invented to measure it, and
the uses to which it has been put. Indeed, this is precisely what they claim to have accom-
plished at the beginning of their conclusion (p. 135). However, as a contribution to history,
the book is an abject failure. Events and developments that occurred before the 1960s or even
1970s are scarcely mentioned, and when they are, the exact details are often inaccurate. The
authors provide no attention to historical context, to the specific intellectual traditions associ-
ated with the various articulations of the notion of intelligence they describe, or to the effects
of the sociological/cultural locations of these developments in shaping the concepts and prac-
tices adopted. Indeed, a quick check of the bibliography reveals that of the approximately 291
works cited, only about 35 (12 percent) were published before 1960. Moreover, although there
is an extensive literature on the history of intelligence and its tests, as the readers of this jour-
nal well know, only five (1.7 percent) of the works listed were historical treatments of the
issues addressed by the book. Indeed, such central figures in the historiography as Hamilton
Cravens, Kurt Danziger, Carl Degler, Raymond Fancher, Nikolas Rose, Franz Samelson, Michael
Sokal, Gillian Sutherland, William Tucker, Adrian Wooldridge, and Leila Zenderland—and I
could go on—are conspicuous by their absence.
So, if not history, then what is Intelligence: A Brief History really attempting to do? At its
best, it provides a survey of some of the developments and issues raised around the psycholog-
ical study of intelligence in the last two to three decades of the twentieth century. The authors
argue that there have been, and still are, seven distinct metaphors that have guided investigations
of intelligence: geographic, computational, biological, epistemological, sociological, anthropo-
logical, and systems. In chapters devoted to the nature, measurement, and teaching of intelli-
gence, as well as to the relative weights of genes and environment in accounting for intelligence
and to group differences in intelligence, they chart how these metaphors shape thinking and
practice in each of these domains. Not surprisingly, given Sternberg’s own theoretical orienta-
tion, the systems vision of how to understand intelligence, which involves “viewing intelligence
as a set of multiple independent parts, or even multiple intelligences” (p. 26) comes off best, as
most consistent with the facts such as they are and most able to reflect the complexities of the
individual dynamically blending genetic inheritance with biological development and sociocul-
tural fashioning. Nonetheless, Cianciolo and Sternberg do an excellent job of providing balanced
overviews of each of these metaphors, why they retain plausibility, and what they are contribut-
ing to current investigations of intelligence. For those seeking an easy-to-digest primer on the
current state of the field suitable for undergraduates, Intelligence: A Brief History could work
very well. Although some practitioners might dispute just how distinct the seven metaphors
really are in practice, they do provide a useful heuristic for coming to grips with and thinking
about contemporary intelligence research.
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As their concluding observation, Cianciolo and Sternberg note: “Although scholarly
thinking about intelligence has an illustrious history, there has never been a more exciting
time than the present to explore the many facets of intelligent behavior” (p. 140). In many re-
spects, this statement captures well both the strengths and weaknesses of Intelligence: A Brief
History. The authors do demonstrate clearly that current research on intelligence is a vital field,
and that the approaches adopted are more varied than the public might realize. On the other
hand, to state without qualification that the history of this work is “illustrious,” given its cen-
tral role in twentieth-century eugenics and many forms of scientific racism, not to mention the
intense political and cultural battles it has engendered, is simply appalling. No one with any
historical training or sensibility would ever advance such a patently unsustainable claim.
Reviewed by JOHN CARSON, Associate Professor of History, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, MI.
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Jerry Aline Flieger. Is Oedipus Online? Siting Freud after Freud. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2005. 332 pp. $19.95 (paper). ISBN 0-262-56207-3.
This year marks the 150th anniversary of Sigmund Freud’s birth and, not surprisingly,
this anniversary is also making headline news. For example, the cover story of Newsweek for
the week of March 27, 2006, read “Freud Is Not Dead” and went on ask whether or not Freud
was still alive in science, psychology, culture, and society. Jerry Aline Flieger, in her book
Is Oedipus Online? Siting Freud After Freud, asks the same question. 
Flieger’s book is part of Slavoj Žižek’s “Short Circuit” series, each of which examines a
classic text, author, or notion and views it through a new and/or different critical lens. Flieger’s
contribution to this series is interesting because Part One of her book analyzes the work of mil-
lennial theorists that resist the contemporary use of oedipal theory, while Part Two argues that
an upgraded oedipal paradigm has a place in millennial theory as Flieger explores Freudian
and Lacanian theory alongside knot theory and the nonlinear theories of emergence and frac-
tal scaling. 
In Part One, Flieger examines a number of millennial theories, with an emphasis on the
works of Žižek, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, and Gilles Deleuze. Žižek, Lyotard,
and Baudrillard’s theories are similar in that they all emphasize the dehumanizing effect of
technology. These “panic postmodernists” argue that technology has created a hypervisible
culture where there is a loss of dimensionality, intersubjectivity, and community (p. 69). They
argue that cyberspace allows for communication without community, leaving no room for a
mirroring “real” other or object; a virtual image replaces real objects, allowing the real and the
imaginary to merge. These three theorists argue that oedipal theory is outdated for postmodern
society because cyberspace replaces the face-to-face interactions necessary for the theory to
be applicable. 
Flieger counters these arguments with the idea that that virtual experiences and the Internet
constitute a new reality, a new “real life.” Because cyberspace is the place where intersubjective
experiences now occur, Flieger suggests that Oedipus is online, “making the computer itself an
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important player in the intersubjective process” (p. 60). In the last chapter of Part One, Flieger
takes on Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, arguing that their work, Anti-Oedipus (1983), re-
duces and limits Freud’s oedipal theory “to the story of Mommy, Daddy, and me” (p. 92)
rather than understanding the theory from a broader social, economic, and political paradigm
that can be used to analyze the “connections, disruptions, and refractions of desire that con-
stitute human social interaction” (p. 94). Throughout the book, Flieger makes reference to
both Freudian and Lacanian theory of the mirroring object or other and discusses how tech-
nology has augmented these. However, Lacan’s postmodern revision of Freud dominates the
text, particularly his theory of desire and his psychic schema, which are used to support her
arguments. 
Part Two of Flieger’s book focuses on nonlinearity and psychoanalysis. Flieger begins by
explaining 12 millennial concepts (nodal sites and nonlinearity) that can be found in contem-
porary culture and argues that these current research topics intersect with psychoanalysis.
Flieger states, “Surfing the millennial web has made one thing clear: if Freud’s theory may
enrich our understanding of ‘millennialism,’ psychoanalysis may in turn be enriched by
examining new techno-cultural phenomena” (p. 155). To support this statement, Flieger goes
on to explain knot theory, emergence, fractals, and bifurcation as they relate to the psychoan-
alytic theories of identification, projection, and intersubjective desire. In addition, Flieger
examines Lacanian network theory, arguing that his concepts of the imaginary, the real, and the
symbolic intersect in a nonlinear fashion, thereby creating psychical and cultural realities that
are multidimensional and fractal in nature.
Is Oedipus Online? Siting Freud After Freud provides the reader with an interesting
amalgam of modern (Freud) and postmodern (Lacan) psychoanalytic theory, millennial the-
ory, and other concepts from contemporary science and culture. Flieger responds to critics of
psychoanalysis while laying out a new framework with which to explore psychoanalytic the-
ory. Thus, this book offers the reader a postmodern analysis that is both enlightening and
thought-provoking.
Reviewed by KATE HARPER, Department of Psychology, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada.
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Alice Boardman Smuts. Science in the Service of Children, 1893–1935. New Haven, CT:Yale
University Press, 2006. 381 pp. $TK.TK. ISBN 978-0-300-10897-4.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 34 percent of all impoverished Americans in 2004 were
under 18 years of age, whereas people 65 and older made up only 9 percent of the nation’s poor.
Behind these numbers is a remarkable story about age and poverty. The Social Security Act of 1935
established both the old-age pensions called “Social Security” and the family assistance program
called “welfare.” Since then, older Americans have benefited dramatically and disproportionately.
A consensus was forged that lifetimes of hard work entitled retirees to public provision in return for
their dedicated service, and over time their Social Security checks took a large bite out of poverty
among the elderly. With the baby boom nearing retirement, it is difficult to envision any reversal of
this consensus in spite of dire predictions about the system’s future fiscal stability.
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In contrast, poor parents were stigmatized from the outset as undeserving freeloaders, all
the more as the numbers of unmarried mothers and “illegitimate” children grew, and federal
efforts to wage war on childhood poverty were, consequently, stingy and politically vulnera-
ble. In 1996, President Clinton declared “an end to welfare as we know it,” eliminating the
federal safety net and invigorating state-based reforms premised on moving absolutely every-
one into the wage labor market, including mothers of babies and young children. It is not
accidental that Alice Smuts’s excellent book ends in 1935, the year that the American welfare
state was born. Her story about the relationship between advocacy and science during the
Progressive era suggests that federal action on behalf of children, a huge victory for child wel-
fare reformers, ironically proved to be no substitute for the tenacious mobilization of women
and researchers on which it was initially built.
Science in the Service of Children brings together histories that have generally been nar-
rated separately and in specialized studies, making it especially useful as an overview. By
tracing the linkages between child study, child guidance, and child development, Smuts
argues that science and social policy were not merely interdependent, but shared the goal of
advancing child welfare. In order to understand the birth of developmentalism—a well-worn
subject in the history of the human sciences—one must also know something about the
female reform tradition, the U.S. Children’s Bureau, and philanthropies like the Laura
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the Commonwealth Fund during the first two decades of
the twentieth century. Sigmund Freud, Arnold Gesell, and Benjamin Spock may be the most
famous architects of developmental expertise, but their fame would have been impossible
without the work of Ethel Dummer, Cora Hillis, and Jessie Taft, among many others. Dummer
was the affluent patron who funded the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute in Chicago, directed
by William Healy, and the El Retiro School for Girls, directed by Miriam Van Waters. Cora
Bussey Hillis was the organizational genius who convinced the Iowa legislature in 1917 to
establish the first center dedicated to studying how normal children developed in order to dis-
seminate reliable child-rearing advice to ordinary people. Jessie Taft was a social work educa-
tor, authority on child placement, and pioneer of therapeutic approaches to child and family
problems. According to Smuts, “Women were the leaders, the innovators, and the driving
force behind the new sciences of childhood” (p. 9).
The book covers a lot of ground clearly and efficiently. It documents the social research
conducted by reformers and settlement house workers, G. Stanley Hall and the child study
movement, parent education, the emergence of child psychiatry, the work of the U.S.
Children’s Bureau during its first two decades, and a host of research initiatives and institutes
committed to the proposition that knowledge about children was key to preventing delin-
quency and conserving precious national resources: future citizens. Smuts comments that no
parallel to the American child sciences existed in Europe. Recent comparative work by social
welfare scholars has emphasized that preoccupations with children and families were the dis-
tinctive, determining factors in state mothers’ pension laws and New Deal social policy.
Maternalism marked the entire history of the American welfare state.
Smuts concludes her book by noting the expansion of child science after 1945. During
the second half of the century, developmental research attracted piles of federal and private
dollars, became ubiquitous in academic psychology and popular culture, and took a sharp turn
away from normal development, concerning itself instead with questions of emotional and
behavioral disorder. If children have been objects of such intense scrutiny designed to safe-
guard their welfare, why are they so much more likely than any other age group to be poor
today? The answer suggested by history is that neither sophisticated science nor benevolent
state power per se can deliver security. Even in the wealthiest country on earth, the patient
218 BOOK REVIEWS
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES DOI: 10.1002/jhbs
pressure of activist movements is necessary if children, as well as adults, are to be guaranteed
the pursuit of happiness.
Reviewed by ELLEN HERMAN, Associate Professor of History, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR.
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Robert Alun Jones. The Secret of the Totem: Religion and Society from McLennan to Freud.
New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 347 pp. $49.50 (cloth). ISBN 0-231-13438-X.
How can a scholar today write a serious book about totemism in late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century anthropology without suffering public opprobrium from his or her postcolo-
nialist colleagues? Robert Alun Jones has written a pithy volume that presents the contours of
the debate among the leading anthropologists from 1865, when John F. McLennan published
his book Primitive Marriage, to 1913, the year in which Freud’s Totem und Tabu appeared.
With a reverential bow to the influential treatise of Thomas Kuhn, he builds upon the writings
of Quentin Skinner, George Stocking, and Richard Rorty proclaiming that the passionate
debate over totemism—conducted by some of the most brilliant minds of the time—holds no
substantial interest for us. It has nothing to do with our truths because the questions it posed
are meaningless in an historical context that is so radically other. By immersing ourselves in
the debate in that time and place, we might be able to see what the fuss was about then, even
if, from the point of view of the positive advancement of science, it was full of sound and fury,
signifying little. 
Having preempted his potential critics, Jones provides us with a highly competent and nu-
anced account of the debate, beginning with discussions of animal worship, patriarchy, and
theories of kinship before McLennan first called attention to elements of totemism in 1865
(when he broke free of the philological shackles imposed by Henry Sumner Maine and others),
and advanced a theory of universal stages of progress from savagery to civilization, especially
in his Worship of Animals and Plants (1869–1870). McLennan began to articulate a “nonin-
trinsic” theory of the sacred in animal worship that was later taken up by Durkheim. But
McLennan was less interested in the religious side of totemism, and, as a rationalist, gave
emphasis to its foundation in kinship (i.e., to its social-organizational roots).
Jones then focuses on the contributions of William Robertson Smith. Smith, an Old
Testament scholar and Hebraist raised in the Free Church of Scotland, was greatly influenced
by nineteenth-century liberal German theology. While studying in Göttingen in 1869, he dis-
covered the theological writings of Albrecht Ritschl. Ritschl and his school incorporated many
of the ideas of Ludwig Feuerbach, even though they believed they had overcome them
(Rawidowicz, 1964, p. 355). Smith learned from Ritschl that religion was social, not individ-
ual, a thought taken up by Durkheim, who, along with Frazer and Freud, had been influenced
by Smith. Durkheim and Freud in particular singled out Smith’s discovery of sacrifice as a
communion with the gods that established kinship. (Levitt [forthcoming] shows that the main
points of Smith’s theory of sacrifice, articulated first in 1887, had been spelled out in an arti-
cle by Feuerbach (1862/1960) entitled “Das Geheimnis des Opfers oder der Mensch ist was er
ißt” [The Secret of Sacrifice or Man Is What He Eats]). 
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Chapter 3 is devoted to the ideas of classicist and later anthropologist James Frazer, a close
friend of Smith from their student days at Trinity College, Cambridge. Influenced by Smith’s theory
of sacrifice and the German Romanticists’emphasis on folk traditions, beliefs, and rites, he compiled
successive editions of The Golden Bough in which he supported the general universalistic and posi-
tivistic framework of social evolutionism. Jones also introduces the works of Fison and Howitt, the
American lawyer and amateur ethnologist Lewis Henry Morgan (who played an important role in
the ethnological writings of Marx and Engels), Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, Robert Henry Codrington,
Frank Byron Jevons, Baldwin Spencer, Frank J. Gillen, and Robert Randolph Marett. The various and
complicated relationships between and among these anthropological writers on various aspects of
totemism developed with fine detail are beyond the limits of a short review.
In Chapter 4, after presenting a brief overview of the influence of Emile Boutroux, Fustel
de Coulanges, and Charles Renouvier on the young Émile Durkheim, and after discussing
Durkheim’s early critique of Herbert Spencer and his sympathetic review of Jean-Marie
Guyau’s L’Irreligion de l’avénir, the author carefully tracks the changes in Durkheim’s think-
ing in relation to the burgeoning debate over totemism. Durkheim, in an article on incest,
argued that the modern incest taboo was derived from the practice of exogamy and not the
other way around. He shows how Frazer (not Smith) had a greater influence on Durkheim’s ear-
lier views. Jones then offers a rather detailed account of Durkheim’s argument in Les formes
élémentaires and shows how it was both indebted to Smith and critical of him. 
The final substantive chapter of the book presents a short history of the development of
psychoanalysis, focusing on religion in general and totemism in particular. Jones points
out Freud’s cautionary words concerning the universality and necessity of totemism as well as
Freud’s distinctions between the psychic lives of “savages” and of “obesessional neurotics.”
The chapter concludes with a comparison of Durkheim and Freud on religion—a comparison
to which one might easily devote an entire monograph. 
The conclusion adumbrates the early critiques of evolutionism, especially those of
Goldenweiser, Boas, and Lévi-Strauss. The book ends with a trumpeting of the self-contradiction
of relativism: “For to learn that what were once assumed to be powerful, undeniable, perma-
nent truths were in historical fact the merest contingencies of a particular context is surely to
learn a more general truth, not just about the past, but about ourselves.” 
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Reviewed by CYRIL LEVITT, Professor of Sociology, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada.
220 BOOK REVIEWS
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES DOI: 10.1002/jhbs
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 43(2), 221–222 Spring 2007
Published online in Wiley Interscience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/jhbs.20230
© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
James Gilbert. Men in the Middle: Searching for Masculinity in the 1950s. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2005. 269 pp. $39.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-226-29324-6.
In the late 1950s, psychologist Abraham Maslow helped launch “humanistic psychology,”
a new and more inclusive theoretical approach designed to transcend the reductionism and
determinism of behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Maslow came to be identified as one of
humanistic psychology’s fathers, but in private he harbored serious doubts about his intellectual
offspring (Nicholson, 2001). At issue was not the scientific integrity of humanistic psychology,
but Maslow’s own personal identity as a man. Turning away from positivist psychology was, he
noted, “almost like giving up maleness” (Maslow, 1979, p. 731). 
It is very apparent from James Gilbert’s fascinating Men in the Middle that Maslow was hardly
alone in his obsessive concern about the state of his masculinity. Contrary to the popular stereotype
of the 1950s, “John Wayne’s America” was a disorienting and anxiety-inducing place where “mas-
culinity” was anything but stable. Indeed, Gilbert finds “masculinity in crisis” in an eclectic range
of cultural locations—sociology, sexology, religion, television, and literature. The 1950s, he argues,
were marked by a “relentless and self-conscious preoccupation with masculinity” (p. 2). 
Although Gilbert’s ambition is to explore masculinity in American culture as a whole,
his work has special relevance for historians of the behavioral sciences. Within this scholarly
community, issues of gender and, more particularly, questions of masculinity have received
relatively little attention. As historian Laurel Furumoto has noted (1998), “[P]olitical, reli-
gious, and class interests are assumed to matter in science… but not gender interests” (p. 70).
By foregrounding “masculinity” in his analysis of such iconic works as David Riesman’s
The Lonely Crowd and Alfred Kinsey’s Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, Gilbert persua-
sively demonstrates the extraordinary degree to which “male panic” was woven into the fabric
of 1950s social science. 
Gilbert’s reading of The Lonely Crowd is especially illuminating. Riesman’s book was a
best seller, and its central argument that American character had been transformed from “inner
direction” to “other direction” was enormously influential in academic circles. Inspired by the
work of sociologists and historians of men’s studies, Gilbert reads Riesman’s classic text against
the grain, viewing it not as a gender-neutral analysis of American character, but rather as a com-
mentary on a masculinity besieged. This gendered reading breathes new life into a familiar text
and, more important, helps to explain the extraordinary popular success of Riesman’s book. By
carefully developing the broader cultural context of popular fears of masculine decline, Gilbert
clearly demonstrates how Riesman emerged as the “reluctant prophet of the new man in this pur-
portedly feminized modern world” (p. 61).
The other social scientist in Gilbert’s study—Alfred Kinsey—is a more obvious candidate
for a gendered reading. Kinsey’s book on male sexuality was one of the “great publishing
events in the history of American science,” (p. 85) and Gilbert carefully explains its academic
and popular impact. Much of this ground has been covered in the extensive historiography on
Kinsey. What is more unusual in Gilbert’s analysis is the attention he devotes to Kinsey’s un-
coupling of male sexuality from masculinity. Surprisingly, Kinsey only mentions masculinity
directly once, yet his unrelenting emphasis on the diversity of sexual behavior lent force to the
notion of a strong “discontinuity between sex as a physical act and socially accepted notions
of morality, normality, [and] masculinity itself ” (p. 105).
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Was masculinity central in the work of other behavioral scientists of 1950s and early
1960s? Gilbert’s focus on American culture leaves this question unanswered, but the very pos-
ing of the question is a measure of the book’s success. As is the case after reading Gail
Bederman’s brilliant book Manliness and Civilization (1995), one comes away from reading
Gilbert alive to the largely untapped potential of masculinity as an analytic category in the history
of the behavioral sciences. 
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Reviewed by IAN NICHOLSON, Professor of Psychology, Department of Psychology, St. Thomas
University, Fredericton, NB, Canada.
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 43(2), 222–223 Spring 2007
Published online in Wiley Interscience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/jhbs.20231
© 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
John P. Jackson Jr. Science for Segregation. Race, Law, and the Case Against Brown v.
Board of Education. New York and London: New York University Press, 2005. xii + 299
pp. ISBN-13 978-0-8147-4271-6 (cloth), ISBN-10 0-8147-4271-8 (paper).
Following recent work by Andrew Winston, William Tucker, and others, Jackson here
delves deeper into the nature and dynamics of the 1950s–1970s pro-segregationist “scientific
racist” camp. Focusing on segregationist responses to the landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of
Education decision, he utilizes numerous archival resources to impressive effect. Unknown
enemies are proverbially more frightening than known ones, and this book left me curiously
reassured. They may have been rich, have had impressive political contacts, and displayed
dogged persistence, but Jackson’s account also reveals the pro-segregationists as profoundly
inadequate to their self-appointed task. Major driving force Carleton Putnam was, otherwise
than financially, no real asset. He was so totally oblivious to the real nature of science and
utterly incapable of the kind of rational debate he proclaimed to be seeking that even his most
ardent supporters eventually became embarrassed by him. Donald Swan turned out to be a
kleptomaniac bibliophile. By contrast, Robert Gayre, editor of Mankind Quarterly, pro-
segregationists’ one attempt at producing a scientific journal, was a bizarre Scottish racial
mystic, obsessed by heraldry, who ruthlessly censored deviations from the party line. But sad-
dest of all was the case of the eminent physical anthropologist Carleton S. Coon, here fully
analyzed really for the first time. Privately backing Putnam to the hilt, Coon was too terrified
professionally to admit it, ending up in the thoroughly tortured position of posing as a pure
scientist with no responsibility for others’ political exploitation of his work while ardently
promoting the segregationist political agenda behind the scenes. The rest of the cast did no
better.
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One should never assume opponents are acting in bad faith, and most of those in question
were not, viewing themselves as brave scientific heretics fighting the delusions of ideological egal-
itarians or defenders of some noble Southern cultural heritage. Alas, they also displayed the clas-
sic symptoms of the paranoid authoritarian personality. They could affirm both that science had
definitively demonstrated race differences and white superiority and that there was a plot to pre-
vent any such research being done. They could only experience opposition as due to some sinister
Boasian, and probably Jewish, cabal. They protested at exclusion from academic and scientific
journals even while being given a hearing, while eliminating any note of criticism from their own
outlets such as Mankind Quarterly. Their internal solidarity was in fact always shaky, as the group
was to some degree an alliance of convenience between southern racists concerned primarily with
African Americans and neo-Nazis seeking to revive anti-Semitic Nordicism, while the more scien-
tifically astute prevaricated between biological essentialism and psychometric empiricism. 
In retrospect, the 1950s–1970s generation of scientific racists (as they identified themselves)
now appear quite historically embedded, their worldviews rooted in late-Victorian notions of racial
destiny and race as the engine of history. And while this generation included several Europeans,
their significant impact was confined to the United States. Even so, their heirs remain, and com-
placency would be folly. Jackson’s mastery of the topic and research resources enables him to pro-
vide a detailed and insightful map of the entire episode, particularly the complex interweavings of
science, law, and political debate that it displayed, and how it helped compel scientists to face their
public responsibilities. I recommend it to anyone interested in the topic from whatever angle. (The
author should, though, have a moan to the publishers about proofreading.)
Reviewed by GRAHAM RICHARDS, Former Director of the British Psychological Society History
of Psychology Centre, London.
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Thomas Teo. The Critique of Psychology: From Kant to Postcolonial Theory. New York:
Springer, 2005. xii + 239 pp. ISBN-10 0-387-25355-6, ISBN-13 978-0-387-25355-8,
e-ISBN 0-387-25356-4.
Building on his extensive work over the last decade, Thomas Teo here boldly attempts a
general “position statement,” upping the ante by moving from critical history of psychology
to a metacritical history of critiques of psychology, with the further twist that such critiques
often take the form of critical histories. Following useful preliminary discussions of the lack
of such a historiography and metatheoretical perspectives on psychology, Teo turns first to
“Kant and Early 19th-Century Critics of Psychology.” Adopting a typology of critiques of
psychology into “natural scientific,” “human-science,” Marxist, feminist, postmodernist and
postcolonial types (each with internal variations), he then devotes a chapter to each before
closing with “Reflections on the Ethical-Political Character of Psychology” analyzing—I fear
a little simplistically—the relationship between politics and psychology. This agenda clearly
requires a wide-ranging knowledge of the history of psychology and its present condition,
which, to the author’s credit, he demonstrates, often with some panache. Anglophone readers
will particularly appreciate his expositions of figures like A. Waitz, F. A. Lange (not Karl of
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emotion fame), W. Dilthey, and K. Holzkamp. It is, though, in the sheer range of issues it
raises that the work’s major value lies. Most directly, and provocatively, relevant to historians
of psychology is his opening claim that his metacritique of “historical critiques” of psychol-
ogy is something historians will find uncongenial: “Critical historians are not interested in a
history of the critique of psychology because it would make their critical historical recon-
structions part of this history” (p. 14). How many critical historians would recognize them-
selves in this? Most will surely find such a move rather intriguing and be sophisticated enough
to acknowledge that their histories are no more external to historical and social circumstance
than the psychologies they criticize for believing they were. Teo himself cannot but descend
from these heights in his final exposition of postcolonial critiques, where meta-critique is quite
muted in favor of passionate promotion. In adopting an oppositional mode to critical history
at the outset, Teo risks forfeiting a certain amount of goodwill in his primary readership. (As
an aside, whether “historical critiques” means those produced in the past or those recently
produced by historians is sometimes unclear.)
Teo also appears, unwittingly, to play a sleight-of-hand game with “psychology” itself. We
have two options, one is to restrict the term’s referent to the “scientific” discipline, which emerged
in late nineteenth-century Europe and North America. Discourses and disciplines existing before
this and elsewhere are thus not psychology; however, they resemble it in their concerns and content.
The alternative is using it in a sweepingly broad manner for all academic, philosophical, scientific,
or religious accounts of human nature of whatever provenance. Yet while Teo is clear that the disci-
pline “psychology” is a recent product of Western historical and cultural circumstances, he remains
prepared to apply it to, for example, Greek thought and contemporary non-Western ideas and be-
lief systems. It might be objected that the polarity is overly severe, leading only to sterile definitional
pedantry, but it does highlight a genuine ambiguity regarding the subject matter of “critiques of psy-
chology” that Teo does not resolve. For example, in illustrating the long-standing “close relation-
ship between political and psychological thinking in Western thought” (p. 187), he instances Plato,
Hobbes, Machiavelli, Locke, and Rousseau. Yet as none used this term and their agendas differed
from modern psychology’s (whatever their historical roles as its “roots”), the term “psychological”
becomes little more than synonymous with “reflections on human nature” and cannot carry the
weight of illustrating his point, which I do not actually dispute. (Also, in this instance, only Locke
in any sense differentiated the political from the “psychological” in his work.)
Regarding “reflexivity,” Teo is obviously conscious of the issue since the book itself
instantiates an original reflexive move on Teo’s part and it permeates a good deal of the discussion
of metatheory in Chapter 2. But he never tackles it head on and, in the reviewer’s opinion, fails to
bite the bullet. For example, he rightly observes, “Persons live and act always on the background
of a sociohistorical and cultural context, and such a fact makes psychology prone to ideological in-
fluences” (p. 38), but does not capture the sense in which ideologies are themselves psychological
products and that we are dealing with a complex reflexive circuitry, not just “influence.”
The absence of serious mention of religion is perhaps only conforming to its usual mar-
ginalization in the historiography of psychology, but conformity is not usually among Teo’s
vices. As Hendrika Vande Kamp has shown, religion figured centrally in the history of the
concept of “psychology” in mainland European thought, especially the rationalist tradition.
Moreover, religious critiques of psychology and debates between the camps have character-
ized most of psychology’s history since the 1860s. It is hard to see where in Teo’s typology
religious critiques would fit, although culturally they have been of considerable significance.
And alongside the “spiritual” turn in much recent psychotherapy, contemporary critiques of
Western psychology from other cultures also often involve incorporating psychological ideas
from indigenous religious traditions into psychology. While insisting on taking this facet of
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the story seriously risks getting one labeled as a pro-religion advocate, continuing to suppress
it is becoming a dereliction of historiographic duty, and it is a pity Teo did not spot this.
As alluded to previously, it is on turning to postcolonial critiques, after a finely impar-
tial analysis of the other varieties, that Teo reveals his own hand, as he was honor-bound to
do. Being committedly engaged in psychology’s present global condition, this is where he
makes his stand, wishing to bury the old “cross-cultural psychology” and help forge an ethi-
cal psychology working for the oppressed and marginalized. Martín-Baró, the El Salvadorean
Jesuit psychologist and author of Toward a Liberation Psychology (1994) murdered by the
military in 1989, is representative of the direction Teo desires. (Indeed, it is, ironically, only
in discussing him that Teo mentions an essentially religious critique.) While entirely sympa-
thetic, I feel caution is needed here. Facing an originally alien culture self-evidently superior
to one’s own in technology, medicine, and physical scientific knowledge, what are rational
persons to do? Might they not indeed, having compared received psychological wisdom to
Western psychological ideas, reasonably conclude that this is, in some respects, as inferior as
received cosmologies and understandings of human biology are to Western astronomy and bi-
ology? This does not entail accepting Western psychological categories as being “natural.”
What it does mean, reverting to reflexivity again, is that if psychology (in the subject matter
sense) is constantly being recreated in the light of lived experience, rational young non-
Westerners, with cell phones, satellite TVs, and e-mail contact with people worldwide, will
necessarily have to adjust and change their psychological concepts accordingly. Western psy-
chologists have to be properly, unpatronizingly postcolonial and accept that non-Westerners
are entitled to evaluate for themselves what is and is not worthwhile retaining or adopting in
both indigenous and Western traditions. It is, in any case, becoming obsolete to label the
global culture now in its birth throes as “Western,” whatever its roots.
There are further minor points of criticism that I will forego, but one does need mentioning. Teo
writes, “[T]he critique of lack of political, ethical, and practical relevance of natural- and human-
scientific psychology drew attention in the mainstream only after 1945” (pp. 21–22). This notion of
a lack of relevance is hard to reconcile with current understanding of how pervasively psychology
affected twentieth-century Western societies, especially in North America. Child rearing, crime,
education, “subnormality,” occupational selection, psychological distress, “race” and racism—all and
more were firmly on psychology’s agenda by 1945, with enormous consequences for their political
management, ethical construal, and relevant professional practice. Critiques of mainstream psychol-
ogy certainly moved up a notch post-1945, but it was not irrelevance that was usually targeted, but
rather how psychology was being used. Psychology cannot be both irrelevant and oppressive. 
But to conclude, and to offset an unfairly negative tone, this is an invaluable work for
which we should all be grateful. It genuinely advances the diverse major debates about the
nature of psychology as a discipline, its place and status in a globalized culture, the ontology
of its subject matter, disciplinary ethics, and the roles of historiography, while the historical
material is generally either new or approached from a fresh direction. The reviewer is, finally,
curious as to Teo’s next move, for there is no way home from here.
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THOMAS TEO RESPONDS:
If one is doling out critique (including my critique of critical historians), one must be able
to accept critique when it is directed against oneself. Besides, I agree with many of the points
developed by Richards. They are valid even if, or because, one takes the purpose of the book
into account. This publication is not intended as an opus magnum. In fact, given the extent of
the theme, this work should be labeled a booklet with modest goals: to develop, for the first
time ever, a systematic history of the critique of psychology; to provide an overview and
sources of literature for those various critiques; and to present a historical-theoretical recon-
struction for mostly didactic purposes.
Richards masterfully challenges my ambiguous conceptual relation toward the dialectic
of history and theory—a problem that cannot be solved in introductory remarks. The struggle
between historical representation and theoretical advancement in one and the same work must
raise concerns for any new historian. The struggle is reflected in my own identity as a historian
and theoretician of psychology. As a solution, I have suggested the perspective of historicist
presentism, in which historical material is assimilated in order to discuss present topics. Such
a perspective ran as a thread throughout the work (thinner in the beginning and thicker at the
end). In doing so, the primacy of theory over history guided the booklet. And it explains my
“passionate promotion” for the latest critique of psychology, which I identified as the post-
colonial one, and to which I intended to make a theoretical contribution.
The primacy of theory also guided my critique of critical and new historians of psychology in
my historical reflections. From a theoretical perspective, new and critical historians of psychology
are not privileged epistemologically over old and traditional ones. Some of my polemics against criti-
cal historians were “unwise” because they are meta-theoretically closer to my own ideas than tradi-
tional ones. Yet, I still believe that the hermeneutic-methodological problematic has not been solved
satisfactorily in the new history. If historical research is a fusion of horizons (Gadamer), then how
can any truth claim (e.g., that there is discontinuity) be justified without making the very present the
standard? Is critical history a metatheory that understands researchers (and their research) better than
they understand themselves because it provides a historical perspective? Is the new history truer
than the old one? If so, such arguments require extensive hermeneutic reflections, which are not de-
veloped and discussed sufficiently in psychological historiography’s literature.
My conceptualization of politics and ethics is, as Richards points out, basic. It was devel-
oped as a heuristic tool that helps students and readers not familiar with the complexities of this
topic to reflect on the relationship between these two domains. Indeed, this heuristic has proven
useful in my undergraduate and graduate teaching. Finally, Richards criticizes me rightly for not
including a serious discussion of the role of religion in the critique of psychology. Yet, I am sure
that historians and theoreticians can identify many more programs that might have been included,
such as psychoanalysis and its developments. One could also argue that the natural-scientific
critique should extend to the feminist or postmodern approaches. One could challenge the
chapters on the feminist, Marxist, and postcolonial critiques as not doing justice to their com-
plexity—how crude to present a Marxist critique of psychology in less than 20 pages, when one
could fill, if not a library, then certainly a corridor with its books.
I will end with a religious quote, because spirituality is so blatantly missing in the book:
“Seek and you will find.”
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Volker Roelcke and Giovanni Maio (Eds.). Twentieth Century Ethics of Human Subjects
Research: Historical Perspectives on Values, Practices, and Regulations. Stuttgart:
Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004. ISBN 3-515-08455-X.
In May 2001, a group of scholars convened in Lübeck, Germany, to discuss the role of
historical events in recent debates about human subjects research. This twenty-three-chapter
edited volume, which grew out of that meeting, aims to provide a more contextually engaged
analysis of topics that have become standard fare in public and scholarly debates about human
experimentation. As Volker Roelcke notes in his introduction, the contributors examine “the con-
tingency of descriptive categories,” such as what counts as an experiment, and “the origins and
development of bioethical institutions,” such as ethics codes and review boards (p. 15). This is an
important project, not least because present-day debates often rely on interpretations of the past to
draw analogies, construct object lessons, and generally appropriate events to various ends—a
process that above all, Roelcke contends, oversimplifies what were complex and at times incoher-
ent social and political struggles. Undergirding this project is a methodological commitment to
understanding human subjects research within specific local and temporal contexts, and the vol-
ume does contain several contributions that will stand as models of such scholarship.
It seems sadly appropriate that the volume’s contributors gathered in Lübeck. Seven decades
earlier, this small Hanseatic city was the site of a tuberculosis vaccine campaign that turned deadly,
which lent momentum to a political movement that resulted in the first state-sponsored human sub-
jects regulations in the West (Germany’s Reichsrichtlinien). The volume is arranged chronologi-
cally, and it is in the section (number three, of six) on the 1930s Lübeck scandal that the book first hits
its stride. Subsequently, the volume crystallizes around sections dedicated to Nazi medicine and the
Nuremberg Code (the fourth section), and the post-Nuremberg debates (the fifth section). Among
many high-quality chapters in these two sections, three contributions should not be missed: the work
by Volker Roelcke on research programs and practices of Nazi investigators, by Paul Weindling on
the discourse management of stakeholders in the Nuremberg Medical Trial, and by Susan Lederer
on the long journey to, and vested interests encoded in, the Declaration of Helsinki. 
These chapters combine novel arguments, lucid style, and—most important, given the
aim of the present volume—serious methodological reflection. Together, they encourage us to
bring the humans back into the history of human subjects research. Roelcke and Weindling
suggest, for example, that an emphasis on the role of the state has diminished the attention paid
to individual actors by recent scholars of human subjects research. Rather than portraying in-
vestigators as agents of the state and subjects as victims of the state, Roelcke argues that the
literature would be enriched by a “comprehensive reconstruction of the identities and biogra-
phies of the victims” (p. 163). Likewise, Weindling suggests that a focus on the state limits
many analyses because investigators’ motivations are left unquestioned, resulting in a literature
that “does not allow for the unscrupulous scientist, who opportunistically exploited state power
and resources for the pursuit of individual research agendas” (p. 178). It is exciting to see open-
ings to pursue this new research agenda even within the chapters offered in the volume. The
important pieces on sleeping sickness by Wolfgang Eckart and Christoph Gradmann can each
be read as stories of research subjects’ resistance to being researched upon and the physicians’
practices of secrecy that were developed as a consequence. Moreover, by paying closer atten-
tion to individual actors, scholars could avoid the paternalism that unfortunately creeps in to
some analyses. Maria Rentetzi’s chapter on women with radium poisoning, for example, could
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be strengthened by considering whether the women did, in fact, have wills or goals of their
own—even if their agency was ultimately thwarted. Also pushing beyond the state, Lederer’s
chapter on the creation of the Declaration of Helsinki documents the tremendous influence that
pharmaceutical companies have had in the history of human subjects research in unexpected
moments. The influence of drug companies throughout the twentieth century also emerges in
Christian Bonah and Philippe Menut’s work on the aforementioned Lübeck scandal, as well as
the more recent cases in Jiri Simek’s analysis of the advent of ethics review boards in the Czech
Republic and Pei Koay’s tale of the creation of Iceland’s genetic database.
In some chapters, contributors undermine the broader goal of the volume by holding his-
torical actors to twenty-first-century ethics standards or interpreting historical documents
only in comparison to present norms. The volume’s best work, on the other hand, seeks to
historicize and thereby comprehend the values and practices of all manner of individuals in-
volved in twentieth-century human subjects research.
Reviewed by LAURA STARK, Program in Science in Human Culture, Northwestern University,
Evanston, IL.
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Hilke Kuhlmann. Living Walden Two: B. F. Skinner’s Behaviorist Utopia and Experi-
mental Communities. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2005. $35.00 (cloth).
ISBN 0-252-02962-3.
Hilke Kuhlmann, an American studies scholar at the University of Freiburg, has written the
first nonparticipant account of the evolution of the major experimental communities that were
directly (and indirectly) inspired by B. F. Skinner’s fictional utopian novel, Walden Two (1948).
In the early 1970s, at the height of the cooperative living movement, there were literally dozens
of interested groups throughout the United States who planned, both successfully and unsuc-
cessfully, to establish Walden Two-type communities. Kuhlmann focuses the bulk of her account
on the two most successful: Twin Oaks in Louisa, Virginia, and Los Horcones near Hermosillo,
Mexico. She also offers briefer accounts of Sunflower House, Lake Village, Walden Three, and
Dandelion Community. To date, the only other systematic sources of information about these
real-life experiments are founder Kat Kinkade’s two books about Twin Oaks (Kinkade, 1973,
1994) and various articles in Communities: Journal of Cooperative Living. Thus, this book is a
welcome addition to the utopian studies literature and a valuable contribution to the history of
psychology. However, it is probably not the last word on the topic. 
Kuhlmann’s interesting and provocative account is based largely on several interviews
with members of the various communities, on her time spent living at Twin Oaks, and on her
briefer visits to the other extant communities. In the Appendix to the book, she includes the
transcripts of her interviews. In some ways, these interviews (especially the two with Kat
Kinkade) provide the most interesting reading. They are useful not only in illuminating the
firsthand experiences of community members and the influence of Walden Two, but also in
revealing Kuhlmann’s own prejudices and biases toward her subject matter. In one of the ex-
changes with Kinkade, for example, Kuhlmann argues that external control should be mini-
mized rather than maximized to “give more space to whatever there is in a human being to
develop from within” (p. 187). Kinkade replies, “You’re not much of a behaviorist are you?”
and Kuhlmann responds, “No, I never said I was.” Although she attempts to maintain jour-
nalistic objectivity throughout some of her account, Kuhlmann observes in a footnote that she
was not able to research Los Horcones more thoroughly because the members tend to “break
off all communication with visitors whom they feel are hostile to behaviorist principles”
(p. 162). Unfortunately, this leads to some holes in her reportage and a decided slant to many
of her conclusions about the group and its individual members. As an approach to the book,
I would recommend reading the interviews first.
Another curious theme that emerges in both Kuhlmann’s account and in some of the com-
munity members’ reflections (although apparently not at Los Horcones), is the expectation that
Skinner should have been more actively involved in the communities movement. As an historian
of psychology (and not, admittedly, a communitarian), I am always surprised by this expectation.
Skinner wrote his novel “in white heat” in a matter of weeks in June 1945 (see Skinner, 1979,
p. 298). When sales picked up in the late 1960s and he began to get more and more inquiries about
a real-life Walden Two, he conscientiously responded to requests and set up a forwarding system
so that Jim and Annette Breiling, two interested behaviorists and Walden Two enthusiasts, could
compile information and coordinate communication. He was, by then, a 60-odd-year-old, well-
ensconced Harvard academic. He corresponded somewhat regularly with Kinkade and other
Twin Oakers, made modest monetary contributions to the community, visited once, and had com-
munitarian visitors to his Harvard office. He was always fairly clear that although he was sup-
portive of others’ efforts to experiment with the good life, community living was not for him. Yet
Kuhlmann writes somewhat accusingly, “Apparently then, Skinner believed that an environment
that he thought would be reinforcing for other people would fail to satisfy his own needs” (p. 44).
While this may be an accurate statement, there were certainly other reasons for Skinner’s reluc-
tance to move to Twin Oaks or Los Horcones.
Other parts of Kuhlmann’s analysis are more useful. She analyzes the fate of the Walden
Two planner-manager system, child care system, and labor-credit system by examining the
communards’ trial-and-error attempts to implement these aspects of Skinner’s vision. She
concludes that all have been abandoned or significantly revised. Twin Oaks, it is clear, has
moved far away from its behaviorist beginnings. Los Horcones has used behaviorism, rather
than Walden Two per se, as its guiding philosophy. Whether Skinner approved or not is largely
irrelevant, but most likely he was pleased that his work inspired real-life experimentation. As
he put it in a 1979 letter to the members of East Wind, an offshoot of Twin Oaks: “I am in
fairly close touch with Los Horcones and of course appreciate the closeness with which they
are following behavioristic principles, but any way to work out the good life is okay with me”
(Skinner, December 13, 1979; emphasis added). 
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Reviewed by ALEXANDRA RUTHERFORD, Associate Professor of Psychology, York University,
Toronto, ON, Canada.
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Jan Goldstein. The Post-Revolutionary Self:Politics and Psyche in France,1750–1850.Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. 414 pp. $45.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-674-01680-7.
In this richly documented and provocatively conceptualized work, Jan Goldstein argues
that the economic, social, and political transformations of revolutionary France led to a debate
over the nature of the self that pitted competing psychologies against each other in an effort to
understand and control the individual in a changed world. As she did in her earlier work on the
French psychiatric profession, Console and Classify (Cambridge University Press, 1987), Goldstein
explores the intersection between politics and the human sciences to yield new insights into the
history of each.
The first two chapters examine revolutionary-era debates over the nature and role of
imagination in human thought. Goldstein demonstrates convincingly that eighteenth-century
psychology was deeply engaged in the study of interior phenomena such as imagination but
only marginally concerned with the self. Because the sensationalist self was built up from dis-
crete atoms through association, it was necessarily contingent, patched together, and weak,
prone to falling apart in a process Goldstein calls “horizontal fragmentation” (p. 5). The pri-
mary means of regulating such a self was by manipulating the environment, through educa-
tion, public spectacle, and political reform. Revolutionary politicians and educators pursued
these means with determination and vigor.
The excesses of the Revolution led to a questioning of the psychological assumptions
that accompanied it. The theoretical foundations of a new psychology founded on an a priori,
unitary, and active self were laid by Maine de Biran, but Victor Cousin popularized the phi-
losophy known as eclectic spiritualism and institutionalized it through the French system of
secondary education. Goldstein focuses on the foundational role of the psychological method
in eclectic spiritualism and on the self that this method reveals. Cousin privileged a process
of interior observation that was both arduous and necessary to produce the reflective self that
characterized the educated individual. Because workers and women had neither the inclina-
tion nor the resources to pursue this process of introspection, only bourgeois males possessed
a fully realized self. Cousin’s psychology fit perfectly with the Doctrinaire conception of a
theoretically open but practically elitist society.
Although Cousin’s became the dominant psychology, it was not the only one. Goldstein dis-
cusses the persistence of sensationalism, which eclectic spiritualism displaced only with
difficulty. The Roman Catholic Church promoted another approach to the self and provided
detailed guidance on how to direct it. In a chapter on Ernest Renan, Goldstein shows how he
employed both the specific discipline of his seminary tradition and the philosophy of Cousin
as he struggled with his faith. Goldstein also explores phrenology as yet another alternative
psychology, one that welcomed women and workers.
French philosophy retained its emphasis on the unitary and active self well into the twen-
tieth century. Goldstein cites Jean-Paul Sartre’s astonishment upon first reading Freud to illus-
trate how thoroughly his philosophical training had ingrained in him the assumption that the
self is one and indivisible (p. 3). Goldstein characterizes the Freudian unconscious as “verti-
cal fragmentation” of the self and suggests that its history is only one aspect of a longue durée
history of the unconscious (p. 329).
The Post-Revolutionary Self draws upon the historiographical insights of Michel Foucault
into the connections between power and knowledge, but it postulates a degree of intentional
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agency that would be alien to the author of The Archaeology of Knowledge. The ascendancy of
eclectic spiritualism owed much to the very determined efforts of Cousin and the philosophers
he trained. Goldstein’s analysis of the letters French lycée philosophy professors wrote to
Cousin illustrates the intensely personal relationships he cultivated with them and their per-
sonal sense of mission. 
Goldstein argues that Cousinian introspection was a “technology of the self ” that assisted in
the production of the bourgeois individual (p. 165). However, as she admits, there is a discrepancy
between the importance of introspection in Cousinian theory and the paucity of examples in prac-
tice. Perhaps the focus could be broadened. Introspection was only one part of a yearlong immersion
in the practice of reflection, logic, and analysis that had few counterparts in Western education. In
this larger sense, Cousin indelibly shaped the post-revolutionary self in France.
Reviewed by JOHN I. BROOKS III, Associate Professor of History, Fayetteville State University,
Fayetteville, NC.
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